Autores
Retchkiman Konigsberg Mordejai Zvi
Título Modelling and verification analysis of cooperative and non-cooperative games via a modal logic approach
Tipo Revista
Sub-tipo CONACYT
Descripción Computación y Sistemas
Resumen In game theory, a cooperative game (or coalitional game) is a game with competition between groups of players (coalitions) due to the possibility of external enforcement of cooperative behavior (e.g. through contract law). Those are opposed to non-cooperative games in which there is either no possibility to forge alliances or all agreements need to be self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats). Cooperative games are often analyzed through the framework of cooperative game theory, which focuses on predicting which coalitions will form, the joint actions that groups take and the resulting collective payoffs. It is opposed to the traditional non-cooperative game theory which focuses on predicting individual players' actions and payoffs and analyzing Nash equilibriums. In this work, the cooperative and non-cooperative game problem is modeled by means of a modal logic formula. Then, using the concept of logic implication, and transforming this logical implication relation into a set of clauses, a modal resolution qualitative method for verification (satisfiability) as well as performance issues, for some queries is applied. © 2021 Instituto Politecnico Nacional. All rights reserved.
Observaciones DOI 10.13053/CyS-25-3-3998
Lugar Ciudad de México
País Mexico
No. de páginas 515-521
Vol. / Cap. v. 25 no. 3
Inicio 2021-07-01
Fin
ISBN/ISSN