| Resumen |
In Smart City applications, we expect high amounts of information to be disseminated among nodes, people, and vehicles, among others. To this end, the use of conventional radio frequency (RF) communications may suffer in serving all data transmissions, considering already saturated channels (used by cellular systems, WiFi, and Bluetooth systems). To this end, the use of light-based communications such as LiFi (light fidelity) could be an adequate way to liberate some of those RF resources. Many forms of data transmission in smart cities have previously been explored, including vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication. The idea encapsulated in this method of communication involves data, such as driving and road conditions, being transferred from one vehicle to another. One way this communication process has been studied is where the data is transmitted using vehicle-to-infrastructure communication, starting at the traffic light, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication, through the light sources on the vehicles. The data transmission process uses Li-Fi and existing light sources, making this form of communication energy efficient. However, the use of light links poses many potential vulnerabilities in case of cyber-attacks, i.e., a malicious agent actively trying to prevent or degrade the data dissemination process. In this work, we mathematically study the impact of an attack in light-based V2I and V2V communication systems using a continuous-time Markov chain. Specifically, we consider the presence of an attacker that is positioned in the queue such that all vehicles behind the attacker will not receive the data being transmitted, as the communication link would have been severed by the attacker. This work aims to investigate and understand the likelihood of this communication being severed and what the result of this disruption would look like. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024. |
